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NATURAL LAW NATURALLY CHANGES
William P. Haas, 1965: Revised 2012

It has been the Thomistic tradition from before the Reformation that the natural law
can change with respect to how well it is understood (quoad notitiam) and with
respect to its correctness (quoad rectitudinem) What concerns us here is particularly
the later, change regarding the very correctness and rightness which is brought about
by a change on the part of nature itself. Thomas Aquinas will be referred to
frequently in this essay because of the richness of his insights and his willingness to
look at the real difficulties in understanding natural law. Furthermore, he deserves
reconsideration because of the fact that he is so often quoted in discussions of natural
law, but also because his approach is often badly misrepresented. The temptation is
for many “ defenders of the faith” to select passages that oversimplify his vision and
ignore his clear understanding that natural law as anything but static, delivered once
and for all, with God whispering directions in our ear on demand. For Aquinas natural
law must be discovered through a lifetime of probing and questioning the natural
universe where the “natural order “ is not 100% consistent or orderly. Human
consciousness and choice is not much better off. It will be argued here that the
acknowledgement that mankind must figure out for itself how best to apply the simple
first principles of rational life to the demands of constant but unstable surroundings
does not compromise the validity of the fundamental principles of morality
If this interpretation of natural moral law is correct, then many Catholic prescriptions,
particularly concerning sexuality and conception, may have to be reexamined and
readjusted, not because the Catholic teachings are inherently wrong , but because they
could be better applied, without compromising sound principles, to a nature now
better understood. Admittedly, this is a challenging hypothesis, but one that is worth
examining out of genuine philosophical convictions and out of a deep respect for the
teachings of Jesus Christ and of the Catholic Church.

Although the encyclical

Humanae Vitae, which condemned all artificial contraception categorically, was

promulgated in 1968 , the weakness of its argument, which relied on a concept of an
inflexible natural law , lingers to this day. From 1968 the encyclical met with serious
reservations by bishops and theologians around the world, especially in Canada,
Scandinavia and Belgium To this day inadequate attention is given to the lingering
questions raised by the Church’s interpretation of natural law. The failure to address
these difficulties as worthy of attention sends honest people to look elsewhere This
essay tries to respectfully reexamine several of these difficulties by supposing that
some major element in the appeal to natural law remain under a cloud. In other
words, if the natural evil of contraception were so self-evident, how come so many
individuals, inside and outside the Church, fail to see it as anything but reasonable
and prudent. In the tradition of Thomas, one can better understand where the truth is
when one can see the cogency of other views. Hence, Aquinas begins every
exploration in the Summa Theologica with the clearest articulation of the best
objections he can find to his own position and then he responds to them with typical
scholastic courtesy - never deny, seldom affirm, always distinguish. The objections
are as real and credible as his own judgment, they are not straw men set up to be
easily dismissed. This spirit will guide the examination undertaken here. Again, the
purpose of this exercise is to strengthen the Church’s message on the sacredness of
life and the sexual union, which begets it.
“Nature” or “natural “ can mean at least two things and their confusion is at the heart
of many difficulties in understanding the Catholic Church’s message about the
sacredness of all life. Confusion about just what is natural about natural law has led
some to dismiss the very notion of natural law as indefensible and irrelevant. But, in
the tradition, nature can mean the intrinsic principle of operation, which makes a
thing to be the kind of thing it is and to behave as a specific type of reality: in other
words, essence. Birds naturally fly, snakes do not. Nature thus understood can also
signify the totality of specific natures in one more or less organized natural universe.
Sea gulls naturally see the fish below and can dive down for lunch. However, natural
can also mean the principle of what happens for the most part ( ut in pluribus ), when

all things are equal or normal. For the most part, it is natural for a man to see, but he
does not cease to be a human being if he happens to be blind. When this distinction is
applied to the first imperative of natural law - be reasonable, do good and avoid evil insofar as it relates to the very humanity of man, there cannot be any change without a
change of the essential coherence of human nature itself.
On the other hand, the secondary principles of natural law or applications of this
central principle can be found in many formulation such as the Code of Hammurabi,
the Decalogue and the Koran. These applications have to do with what is generally
the most rational way to fulfill the capacities and inclinations of human persons
within the experience of the natural universe with its own diversity and instability.
Here there is room for variety, change and degrees of necessity. Monogamy, society,
private property, capital punishment, war, and education are naturally good for
humans ( ut in pluribus ), for the most part. They have a relative certitude about them
which is less than absolute. All things being equal, which they usually are, these are
surely reasonable goods for mankind. But, all things are not consistently balanced and
nature itself often goes astray.
Thus one view of natural law is that it is not limited to a set of certain, unchangeable
and self-evident principles which apply certainly to all moral deliberations and
choices, with no exceptions Although it surely involves the application of principles,
natural law is also the continuous search of human reason for an understanding of its
own rational nature and of the natural universe of which it is a part. It is the nature of
man to be curious about the curiosities of nature, and nature on the grand scale
includes that curious being man, so that the natural moral law evolves out of the
probing and unending curiosity of individuals and groups in the unfinished business
of being human, individual and social, and of protecting the natural world from
human exploitation and degradation
It is useful to acknowledge that human reasoning goes far beyond the deduction of

certain conclusions from self-evident principles: deduction is analytical reasoning.
Synthetic reasoning (induction) is also essential for humans to discover what is
probably correct from the evidence of mounting experience throughout life.
Furthermore, hypothetical reasoning (abduction) is no less essential when the
fragments of experience yield only the suggestion of what is possibly natural. Thus
the process of reasoning from first principles involves deduction when the evidence if
certain; reasoning involves induction when the evidence is observable and calculable,
and reasoning involves abduction when one can only guess at the possibilities to be
explored. Like empirical science which develops from an hypothetical conjecture to a
reliable scientific law, natural law emerges out of the creative fullness of human
reason , not out of the narrowest exercise of deductive reasoning. Sometimes a good
guess is as important to growth as is a certain conclusion.,

This more recent

elaboration of reasoning, found in the work of C.S.Peirce, is implied in Thomas
Aquinas’ assertion that, while the bare-bones self-evident principle of natural law is
absolute, everything else in moral deliberations is conditioned by what is discovered
through experience and learning - per inventionem secundum viam experimenti, vel
per disciplinam. ( II-II, q. 47, a. 5 )
This essay is itself based on an educated guess, an hypothesis, that maybe the few
certain principles of natural law are perfectly applicable to the human experiences of
a very changing and incomplete nature of a nature which sometimes actually
contradicts itself. To paraphrase Thomas Aquinas, nature is as imperfect as are the
humans who try to understand it and thus natural law is the endless attempt to get it
more or less correct. This supposes that natural law is inaccessible as a finished
product, thoroughly understood from beginning to the end and simply applied to all
situations.

Nature seems to contradicts itself when a human being is naturally

conceived but forced by that very nature to destroy itself and its mother, as, for
example, when the conception takes place in the Fallopian tubes. In other words,
humans confront a natural world, which naturally makes mistakes. Similarly, when it
is said that a human person with full human rights exists in the womb from the

moment of conception, as much is left unsaid as is said.
The process by which an early human embryo is fertilized, divides, implants in the
womb and then recruits blood vessels to nourish the placenta has been called “ the
most awe- inspiring metamorphoses in all of nature” Yet it is considered to be “
horribly inefficient” because it fails as often as it succeeds. It is claimed that, at
minimum, two-thirds of all fertilized human eggs fail to implant within the first week,
or they are often later aborted naturally. It is also estimated that almost one-third of all
implanted embryos later miscarry. Even if these estimates are not 100% accurate, they
do suggest that the natural process of conception and gestation does not always work
perfectly,
Not being a scientist one can only assume that some fraction of these claims warrant
serious attention in trying to assess the meaning of “ from the moment of conception
“, since the process is rather complicated and often not brought to completion. Just
what value or “sanctity” nature attaches to the personhood of the evolving reality in
the womb is a mystery to many reasonably informed individuals who seek only to
discover what is naturally reasonable when they must make life and death choices
within the limits of time and place. They rightly ask how one can be held responsible
for “murdering” a mysteriously hidden reality that nature itself often treats as
expendable in certain situations. Apparently, not every human entity conceived is
naturally destined to be born whole and entire as a person . So, efforts to save the life
of a mother, a person in the fullest sense, by removing the mysterious lethal threat to
her life may seem quite reasonable when a couple is faced with a crisis pregnancy.
And it is important to note that, even if persons were in error about this very difficult
judgment, they have the natural and God-given obligation to make the decision that
appears most reasonable to them.
In the light of the common occurrences of natural abortions, miscarriages and ectopic
pregnancies, which people are well aware of, the claim that a person exists in the

womb from the moment of conception does not appear self-evident at all.
Furthermore, there is the serious danger of thinking that anyone who does not see
what is claimed to be self-evident, must necessarily be at fault and therefore
hopelessly immoral and stupid and not worth teaching. The natural uncertainty is not
lessened by the type of circular reasoning which attempts to invent self-evident truths,
as, for example, when it is argued that the being in the womb is a person because it is
a “human being” and all human beings are person. This “self-evident” proposition
avoids the fact that many living realities are truly human, and of no other species, but
never pass as persons, for instance, a living human heart being transplanted, human
semen, human eggs and other phenomena which participate in the human entity but
are incomplete and incapable of sustaining their own reality. The life in the womb
from the “moment of conception” does indeed deserves to be treated as sacred
because it is a manifestation of the God’s largess , without the feeble attempt to make
it into something it possibly is not and for which there is little if any natural evidence.
Even without religious convictions human life at its origin deserves to be protected
and nurtured because it is natural and reasonable, all things being equal, when they
are so.
Aquinas clearly spells out how the precepts of the natural law can be modified by
particular impediments arising from the contingencies and imperfections of nature
itself. Things can go wrong with the natural order of goods, or the natural order, say
of generation and conception, is naturally random and incomplete as if it were never
meant to be otherwise. His example is clear enough: one would not be obliged to
return a weapon to its rightful owner if the owner were angry or insane enough to
misuse it. It is not natural for humans to lose control of themselves (for the most part
), but they sometimes do. Private ownership is a good invention, but it is not essential
in every instance to human well-being . Aquinas never overlooks the contingency of
moral decision making in the real world full of its own contingency. What should not
happen in nature sometimes does and man must naturally adjust his thinking and
decisions accordingly. (I-II q. 94 and 96, Ethics, lectio 12, III Sentences, d. 37, q. 1, a.

3 ). Natural law would hardly be natural if it overlooked the essential characteristic of
a created, contingent and imperfect universe, with man as its morally conscious
inhabitant. Of course such thinking smacks of relativism: indeed it does, because the
absolute principles of natural law are not absolute at all if they are not related to the
reality of unfinished nature as God creates and sustains it. Absolute principles are the
basis of relativism in ethics: what else is relevant to the real world?
In his exploration of the complexity and contingency of natural law, Thomas Aquinas
suggests that a primary principle of natural law is self-preservation. In I-II, q. 94, a.2
Aquinas places man squarely in the center of the natural universe and argues that “
whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles,
belongs to the natural law” He emphasizes that man shares this imperative of selfpreservation with all other substances in creation, with other animals, and with his
own rational convictions “Wherefore, according to the order of natural inclinations
is the order of the precepts of the natural law.” Natural law is often described as a
participation in divine wisdom: like all truths, this one can easily be misunderstood as
some kind of a priori vision of a perfectly harmonized world, discovered completely
from scratch with a clear vision of God orchestrating it. One will not find this
oversimplified version of moral growth in Aquinas’ work, where even the discovery
of God’s existence and characteristics is a long and difficult process (Summa Contra
Gentiles, I,1) demanding a profound commitment to the work of abductive reasoning
about a possible truth long before the final truth is discovered. Aquinas’ vision is
more common sense: if you want the truth about natural law you must spend your life
working at it.
This primary principle of natural law, self-preservation, is discovered from contact
with the external arrangement of the world of things and animals. It is not derived
from theory alone, though it enjoys a theoretical coherence. Aquinas does not hesitate
to examine whether it would be permissible for one to kill another in self-defense. In
II-II, q. 64, a. 7, he offers the challenging distinction that “Nothing hinders one act

from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is besides the
intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended and not
according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental. Accordingly the act
of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the
slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own
life is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in “being” as
far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be
rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end….‘it is lawful to repel force by
force provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense’. Nor is it
necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to
avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life
than of another’s”
Unfortunately, this powerful insight of Aquinas rarely appears in discussions of
natural law and certainly not in discussions of therapeutic abortion or of artificial
contraception. However, one who applied this common sense thinking to a lifethreatening pregnancy could hardly be considered irrational or immoral for
concluding that the first obligation was to do whatever was possible and necessary to
save the endangered life of the one making the judgment.

Though Aquinas

acknowledges that aggression justifies defense, he never indicates that the guilt or
innocence of the aggressor is the determining moral factor. The primary natural
obligation is to the self, not to the other. Furthermore, the one threatened is left to
figure out what constitutes “blameless” or “moderate “ self-defense. That may well
depend on the availability of other help, the availability of weapons, of instruments
of constraint, and depend on how much time one has to make a decision. Maybe
playing dead like a possum might ward off further danger - a hazardous guess,
perhaps, but not unreasonable.
These contingencies can only be determined by one rational enough to size up the
situation in which the lethal aggression occurs and to figure out just how lethal the

aggression really is and how best to deal with the threat. The moral certainty is in the
principle “save yourself“: but the principle is only a principle, it does not tell you
how to go about saving yourself. That, you must figure out for yourself, reasoning
inductively and abductively about the probabilities and possibilities which lie in the
details of the concrete situation
A physical or mental condition, an economic crisis or domestic crisis might threaten
the stability of a marriage or family in a way that makes the sexual bond to be
especially important in preserving the spiritual and emotional well being of the
parents and children. The use of artificial contraceptives may also appear to be the
most rational, “blameless” and “moderate” way to survive the immanent danger. As
in self defense, the decision to save the vitality of the marriage by whatever means are
available would be the primary and defining intention, while the effect of limiting the
number of children by artificial contraception would be secondary and accidental. The
parents may ardently desire more children if the mother could survive another
pregnancy or if the parents could care for additional children.

The artificial

instrument, the contraceptive, no more determines the moral integrity of the decision
than the instrument of self-defense (gun, sword, the pepper spray, rope, fire, etc.)
determines the morality of self defense. These judgments of conscience involve all
the functions of reason, deduction, induction and abduction. In a given crisis, there
may well be elements that are certain, others that are probable and others that are only
possible. Being as reasonable as possible is not exactly the same as simply deducing
clear conclusions from relevant principles. No principle by itself in isolation from the
rational appraisal of the contingencies of the situation has any moral relevance by
way of deduction alone. Often enough, reality offers little more than probabilities and
possibilities to guide the morally conscious person who is seeking whatever wisdom
he or she can find, when it is needed It would be unfair to Thomas Aquinas to suggest
here that he ever imagined that his words would be used to support an argument
against the teaching of the Catholic Church, yet it would be even more unfair to him
to ignore the power of his insight, so tersely stated and overflowing with implications,

for the sake of avoiding some painful corrections.
A somewhat different kind of example may illustrate the compatibility of sound moral
principles with specific choices, which seem contradictory.

Consciousness, for

instance, is surely an essential condition of a fully human life. Yet it can happen in
certain crises that the well being of a person and of others requires that consciousness
be suspended, when for example, extreme pain, extreme stress or agitation produces
greater harm to self and others than the temporary loss of consciousness. Using
alcohol or drugs to dim one’sconsciousness for no other purpose than pleasure, is
irrational and immoral because it obliterates the natural good that makes persons
responsible for themselves and others.. But the use of alcohol or drugs as medical
necessities, or even violence, to suppress consciousness can be the only rational
choice in some extraordinary circumstances The instruments do not define the
morality of the choice: that is determined by the basic intention of the action, to
protect all those who need protection. Beneath the surface of such situations is the
sense that the real moral principle is “the end justifies the means” Well, shocking as it
may seem, nothing else justifies a means but an end or purpose which makes the
means to actually be the only or best way to the end or purpose. Nothing else makes a
means to be a real means but a real purpose (ratio mediorum sumitur a fine) Yet, this
generality is too often misconstrued to mean that any end justifies any means as long
as it works.. However the traditional sense of the principle is that a truly rational
human purpose justifies whatever truly human means , natural or artificial, are
necessary to accomplish that end.
Nature, in the sense of the total natural universe, once in a while (ut in pauchioribus)
mistakenly reverses itself as when any species overpopulates itself with regard to it
natural environment. Natural history is full of instances of former species, which
have disappeared because of natural turns of events. Oddly enough, the claim that
nature sometimes presents obstacles to its own purposes, as Aquinas sees it , rest on a
clear cut realism which admits that there is indeed a continuity in nature which does

reveal structure and finality or purpose , but it also reveals the variations on the theme
of order and structure. Order and chance are complementary, not contradictory or
mutually exclusive. This structure and purpose in all natural phenomena along with
the intrinsic contingency affecting all natural creation is oddly the foundation of the
integrity of the whole sweep of moral natural law from universal principles to
existential practice The abiding structure of the first rational principles makes the
variations and chance in the secondary principles reliable. Therefore, a well-founded
natural moral law, to be true to itself, must also be practically relevant to those real
exceptions to some of its own operating rules.

Thus, for example, intercourse

produces children - generally -, but not every act of intercourse produces a child and
those acts that start the process of gestation do not always finish it. The half-finished
task of human development within the womb, as in a miscarriage, appears to be an
unnatural natural event, leaving the rational observer with more questions than
answers about what it is that mother nature actually teaches. Again, the stability and
structure of the natural process of generating offspring sustains the variation and
chance within nature and within the morality that seeks to follow that stability and
flexibility in nature. One begets children to endure a long and,

at times,

unpredictable journey to completion.. The journey begins with possibilities, travels
through probabilities and hopefully arrives at certainty - for a while. The fundamental
imperative of natural morality is to keep trying, keep looking, keep asking and do not
imagine you will ever get it all correct.

ADDENDUM
A final reflection on Natural Law Naturally Changes
It would be useful here to acknowledge that behind the assertion that natural law changes
because everything in nature, including human nature, is subject in one way or another to change
and contingency, lies the philosophical conviction that finite being does not exist or function
necessarily. In a word, everything that just happens to be as this or that kind of thing is part of a
finite universe of conflicting causes, inept agents and indisposed matter. Creation, therefore,
could not be other than imperfect in both the way it exists and in the way it acts.
One of the earliest witnesses to this sweeping vision was Aristotle, about whose
works, Metaphysics and Perihermenias Thomas Aquinas wrote penetrating commentaries. In his
reflection on the Metaphysics, VI, lectio 3, no. 1210 Aquinas offers: “If then, we attribute all
contingent events here to particular causes only, many things will be found to occur accidentally.
This will be so for a number of reasons: first, because of the conjunction of two causes one of
which does not come under the causality of the other…. Second, because of some defect in the
agent, who is so weak that he cannot attain his goal and third, because of the indisposition of the
matter, which does not receive the form. This is what occurs, for example, in the case of the
deformed parts of animals.” This comment about deformed animals cannot exclude the human
animal: it might also be applied to much that occurs in human reproduction, as when a selfdestructive conception also threatens the life of its own mother.
In no.1217, Aquinas adds: “It now remains to see how the affirming of fate or providence does
not eliminate contingency from the world, as if all things were to happen of necessity.” And in
no. 1221 “However, insofar as an effect is considered under its proximate cause, not every effect
is necessary, but some are necessary and some contingent in proportion to their cause.”
In the commentary on Perihermenias, book 11, 14 n.6 Aquinas further elaborates: “…universally
in the things not always in act, there is the potentiality to be or not to be. In natural things it is
therefore possible for them to be or not to be… There is also the possibility of becoming or not
becoming. Such things neither are nor come to be of necessity, but there is in them the kind of
possibility which disposes them to becoming and to not becoming, to being and not being.”
From a very different perspective, less metaphysical and more psychological, Aquinas asks
whether Any Pleasure is Not Natural. I-II Q. 31, Art. 7. Here he illustrates how human affairs can
be radically transformed by accidental disruptions, claiming that certain behaviors which would
be against human nature (and natural law) become connatural for particular individuals because
of the intrusion of many different kinds of accidental factors. He notes that ‘nature’ can be taken
in two ways. “First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man’s
nature….Secondly, nature in man can be taken as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that
which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man that does not obey
reason.” Thus the pleasures of food, drink sleep and sexual intercourse afford man natural
pleasure. In this category “we find some that are not natural speaking absolutely, and connatural
in some respect. For it happens in an individual that some one of the natural principals of the
species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes

accidentally natural to this individual… And this corruption may be either on the part of the
body - from some ailment; thus for a man suffering from a fever, sweet things seem bitter and
vice versa, - or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth or coals and
the like: or on the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the
unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such things which are not in accord with human
nature.”
Of course, Aquinas is not saying that such “accidentally natural” conditions of individuals set a
norm in natural law for all human, but he is asserting that accidents can transform what is
“natural” for human beings generally, who have not been so adversely affected, into a kind of
connatural adaptation in those who have been so affected. He certainly is not ruling out the vast
and profound influence of accidental and contingent events in shaping the destiny of individuals.
And there is no evidence that Aquinas imagines that all such “accidentally natural” conditions
are the result of genuinely evil human acts of the individuals affected. In summary, from
Aquinas‘ acknowledgement of the “connatural” and “accidentally natural” conditions of some
individual it is obvious that the natural law must be modified as it is applied to their individual
situations, without any compromise of the general validity of the principles of natural law
“speaking absolutely.”

